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 In the past decades, the Chinese government has 
popularized the concept of wenming, translated into 
English as civil, civility, civilization or culture, through its 
political and practical use in the public space: banners, 
pamphlets, advertisements and clips on how to behave as 
a proper citizen. This paper analyzes the epistemological 
implications of a concept that signifies beyond its own 
terms. Thus, taking a holistic perspective and employing 
historiographical, linguistic and ethnographic sources, 
the author links the current wenming policy to a structure 
of power reproduced throughout Chinese history, and 
endorsed by the state even during the most revolutionary 
periods. This structural inequality works as a normalizing 
apparatus that excludes the rural over the urban –class 
normalization–, the ethnical other over the Han majority –
racial normalization– and the feminine over the masculine 
–gender normalization. A process that has been marked 
by key historical milestones such as the emergence of 
Confucianism, Western imperialism, the birth of Chinese 
nationalism and the re-introduction of market economy 
in 1978. The author distinguishes this “process of 
civilization”, a sociogenetic, heterogeneous and multifocal 
phenomenon, from the concreteness of a political discourse 
conceptualized in the post-Mao era as a set of particular 
words and campaigns that the Chinese Communist Party 
has been shaping since the early 1980s. Therefore, the 
title of this paper From Process of Civilization to Policy 
of Civilization describes a transition from the abstract 
historical process –the wenming process– to the specific 
political campaigns of wenming –the wenming policy–, 
being the latter the reification and institutionalization of the 
ongoing normative process described above.
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En las últimas décadas el gobierno chino ha popularizado 
enormemente el concepto de wenming, traducido como “civil, 
civilidad, civilización o cultura”, a través de su utilización 
política y práctica en el espacio público: anuncios, carteles, 
paneles animados y demás media donde se promociona la 
práctica del buen ciudadano. En este artículo se analizan las 
implicaciones epistemológicas de un concepto que va más 
allá de sus propios términos. Así, desde una perspectiva 
holística y empleando fuentes historiográficas, lingüísticas 
y etnográficas el autor vincula la actual política wenming a 
una estructura de relaciones de poder desigual que ha ido 
reproduciéndose a través de la historia, excluyendo lo rural 
frente a lo urbano –normalización de clase–, lo étnicamente 
diverso frente a la mayoría Han –normalización racial– y lo 
femenino frente a lo masculino –normalización de género. 
Un proceso marcado por hitos históricos como son la 
aparición del confucianismo, el imperialismo occidental, 
el nacimiento del nacionalismo chino y la reintroducción 
de la economía de mercado en 1978, cuyas implicaciones 
sociológicas han perdurado incluso durante los periodos 
más revolucionarios. El autor distingue este “proceso 
civilizatorio”, sociogenético, heterogéneo y multifocal, 
de un fenómeno mucho más concreto conceptualizado 
a través de una serie de palabras y campañas que el 
Partido Comunista Chino ha estado produciendo desde la 
década de los ochenta. Así, el título del presente trabajo 
From Process of Civilization to Policy of Civilization, 
hace referencia a esta transición del proceso abstracto e 
histórico –el proceso wenming– a la concreción de una 
política wenming, siendo esta última la forma reificada e 
institucional de dicho proceso normativo.
The German sociologist Norbert Elias (1987) 
described the “process of civilization” as a historical 
social phenomenon that derived in the pacification of 
bodies, that is, the moralization of bodily expressions and 
self-containment through ritualized actions, what today is 
commonly known as “manners, etiquette or courtesy”. If we 
look at how in present times the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) is employing the term wenming 文明 translated 
into English as “civil, civility, civilization, civilized or 
culture” it is clear that a correlation can be made between 
the Elias’ definition and the wenming political project. In 
this research, I try to deepen in the analysis of the concept 
of wenming as a historically formed ideology that has its 
roots in fundamental aspects of traditional thought and 
the emergence of national identity in China. We will look 
first at Confucianism as the earliest cultural and political 
frame from which the civilization paradigm was stablished. 
Second, we will emphasize on the importance of western 
colonialism in the definition of the civilizing center through 
categories of class and ethnicity. Third, we will take a 
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secondary concept as weisheng 卫生 “hygiene” to explain 
how the foregoing republican state promoted a gendered-
based institutionalization of civility. Finally, we will link this 
procedural epistemological order with the CCP’s current 
policy on civic behavior in the urban space, disclosing its 
consequences in form of social inequality. This theoretical 
outline follows a holistic approach that relies on historical, 
linguistic and ethnographic sources –in both Chinese and 
foreign languages–, as well as on the author’s own work in 
Chinese urbanities.
There is a vast consensus among scholars on the fact 
that Chinese thought has been shaped by an ontological 
view of the world that is relational (some examples are Fei, 
2009; Hwang, 2000; Page, 2012; Rosker, 2008). After the Qin 
unification in the third century BCE the “heaven’s mandate” 
tianming 天命, a meritocratic and action-dependent form of 
governance, became the ideological template to legitimate 
the overthrow of one dynasty for another. The Han (206 BCE 
- 220) would later harvest this idiosyncratic soil to offer a 
coherent and unified system of thought: Confucianism. 
 The embracement of Confucian doctrine by the Han 
state was a method of justifying the sustentation of power 
beyond blood and kinship, formalizing a correspondence 
between social position and responsibility –action. In 
Confucianism meaning is only possible within a tautological 
relation to practice, Confucius frames it this way in his most 
famous statement: junjun chenchen fufu zizi 君君臣臣父
父子子. To comprehend this sentence we have to take into 
account that in Chinese language –especially in classical 
Chinese– nouns also function as verbs: “the sovereign acts 
as a sovereign, the minister acts as a minister, the father 
acts as a father and the son acts as a son” (Golden, 2010: 
231). Here, we should not consider meaning as emptied by 
what “act as” it is supposed to signify in the vast domain 
of the common sense, but rather understand meaning as 
fragmented and specified through ritual practice –li 禮. For 
Confucius “behaving humanly is behaving ritually” (Cheng, 
2002: 65). In this sense, the classic Book of Rites –liji 禮
記– was the moral ground on which Confucian doctrine 
was stablished, a compendium of rites of social interaction 
full of instructions on how to behave in every context 
accordantly with one’s position. 
Altogether, we can say that Confucianism prioritizes 
relational context over general abstractions –as good or 
evil–, formalities over essences –e. g. inner feelings– and 
practice over discourse. A surprisingly secular socio-
political system based on what Mary Douglas (2001) calls 
rituals of purity, the positive ordainment of reality to create 
a unity on experience that ensures predictability in an 
inherently conflictive social life. 
Following the sociological guidelines of Norbert Elias, 
we can conclude that with the emergence of Confucianism 
a civilizing process started in China at least a half millennia 
before the European Renaissance. The foremost obvious 
distinction between European and Chinese processes is that 
wenming文明 has no etymological reference to the city, in 
contrast with the English civilized that derives from the Latin 
civis. In fact, the Chinese concept is a neologism created 
by the Japanese from the word bunka 文化 “culture”, 
introduced in China during the mid-nineteenth century 
1.THE CHINESE PROCESS OF CIVILIZATION IN 
TRADITIONAL THOUGHT
1.1 THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONFUCIANISM 
AS A PROCESS OF CIVILIZATION
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when the Japanese began to translate abundant European 
literature (Erbaugh, 2008). 
The character wen 文 –the semantic unity of the word– 
refers to a “person with clothes” or “decorations”, later 
understood as “literacy” or “written language and culture1”. 
The political expert Thomas Boutonnet (2011) argues that 
the translation into Chinese of the English civilization 
term just added more layers of significance to the already 
polysemic word for culture wen. However, if we look at 
Norbert Elias’ analysis of the civilization apparatus during 
the eighteenth century Europe, we find a dispute between 
the Germanic conception of civility based on the cultivation 
of the spirit-intellect, and the French idea of civilization 
as the over-codification of daily life practices aiming to 
produce an embodied classification between the highborn 
and the Bourgeoisie. Neither of the two interpretations were 
new to Confucianism and both were already present in the 
term wen. From its origins, Chinese traditional thought 
conceived culture and behavior as one class-based totality. 
 On the other hand, the process of civilization 
in Europe remained mainly as an urban phenomenon. 
Confucian thought was also disseminated by the court but 
as a practical system of governance that affected all citizenry 
equally –including peasantry. The ruler had to act ritually 
as a ruler in order to continue with the exemplary chain of 
hierarchic order: “from the Son of Heaven down to ordinary 
people, all must consider the cultivation of the person as 
the root of everything” (Confucius cited in Fei et al, 1992: 
74). The fact that we still translate in modern Chinese 
the words for courtesy, etiquette and manners in terms of 
ritual li 礼    (禮): limao 礼貌, lijie 礼节 or yi仪 (儀), 
another Confucian concept as in liyi 礼仪 or yishi 仪式, 
probes that the Chinese process of civilization cannot be 
disassociated from classical thought.
 Another key feature of Confucianism is the way the 
dichotomy “inside” nei 内/ “outside” wai 外renders. Only 
in recent times China has shifted from an agricultural mode 
of organization where the insider is strongly differentiated 
from the always-suspicious outsider, to an urban-centered 
society where these limits are more diffuse. As the notorious 
sociologist Fei Xiaotong remarks, agricultural society 
depends deeply on relations of familiarity that expand in 
concentric circles from a particular ego:
“The self is always at the center; so, like the 
motionless North Star, the self is always surrounded 
by others who come under the influence of the 
center. In this regard, Confucius is not like Jesus 
Christ. Jesus transcends human organizations. 
He has his Heaven; so he can sacrifice himself for 
the sake of Heaven, for something beyond human 
society. […]Confucian ethics cannot be divorced 
from the idea of discrete centers fanning out into a 
weblike network” (Fei et al, 1992: 68).
Thus, the law of ritualized reciprocity is confined to the 
scope of these relations of familiarity –usually defined as 
the extended family– in opposition to the other that falls, if 
not outside, into the margins of morality.
“In Chinese rural society, there are special markets 
created for trading. The markets usually are located 
1.   For all etymological references the following online dictionaries were consulted: 
      http://ctext.org/, http://www.chineseetymology.org and http://www.zdic.net    
[CON]TEXTOS (2017) 7:5-11, ISSN: 2013-0864
© de l’article, Maria Esperança Carrió Cabrer
© de l’edició, Associació Antropologies
REVISTA D’ANTROPOLOGIA I INVESTIGACIÓ SOCIAL
27
20  ISSN: 2013-0864
Ar n Rom o Moreno
not in a village but in an open space. People from 
all over come to this special place and act, as they 
say, ‘without human feelings’ (wuqing). When they 
trade, people momentarily set aside their original 
relationships and settle all exchanges on the spot. 
I have often seen neighbors carrying goods to a 
market ten miles (li) away to exchange with each 
other and then walk the long distance back home 
again. Why can’t they exchange at their front doors? 
Why should they make such a long trip to the 
market? The trip has its function. When standing at 
their own front doors, they are neighbors. But when 
they are in the market, they are ‘strangers’. The act 
of settling accounts on the spot should occur only 
between strangers and should not involve other 
social relationships” (Ibid. 126-127).
 With all, while Confucian civility was a much 
broader institution than the one restricted to the city, it 
is also true that a historical differentiation between rural 
and urban has imprinted the process of civilization. The 
historian Si-yen Fei argue –in opposition to Max Weber’s 
despotic clause– that at least since the times of the Tang 
dynasty (617-907) Chinese urbanities developed more 
and more into independent and even contesting political 
centers. While the distinction was not grounded on the 
type of capital accumulation, cultural differences in terms 
of taste, style and educational status were very significant 
(Fei, 2009). It is important though, not to take Confucianism 
as a homogenous and everlasting system of thought that 
defines Chinese society as a whole. Instead, we should 
think of it as the hypostasis of certain traits that have 
endured within the Chinese social structure, with or without 
an explicit formulation of the doctrine. The sinologist Ann 
Cheng (2002) makes this point when referring to the big 
popularity of Buddhism since the Tang period: “the success 
of Buddhism in his universalist project comes largely 
determined because of its autonomy respect a cultural and 
social order as the cast system in Hinduism or the clan 
bounds of Confucianism” (p. 358).
   To recapitulate the arguments presented in this 
section; we have discussed Confucian thought as a genuine 
Chinese process of civilization that began at least in the 
third century BCE. We can draw parallels with the European 
process insofar as both represent a form of codifying social 
interaction through the way of rites –body containment–, 
education –culture– and social stratification –hierarchies. 
The main differences would be that Confucianism, as a 
much broader institution, transcends the dichotomy rural/
urban and, at the same time, relies on a fundamental 
distinction between the inside, the extended family where 
the laws of reciprocity are very strict, and the outside –the 
anonymous stranger– towards whom these laws are not per 
se applied.   
Although China is one of the oldest states of the world, 
it is also one of the latest nations (Leibold, 2007). The 
birth of the Chinese state is frequently situated in the Qin 
unification; the powerful measures of standardization –
scripture, coin, carriage wheels, etc. – that the emperor Qin 
Shi Huang promoted alongside with a strong and rational 
administration of the territory settled the basis for the most 
fundamental political and cultural conceptions of China 
(Gernet, 2005). 
2.THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM
[CON]TEXTOS (2017) 7:5-11, ISSN: 2013-0864
© de l’article, Maria Esperança Carrió Cabrer
© de l’edició, Associació Antropologies
28
20  ISSN: 2013-0864
Ar n Rom o Moreno
[CON]TEXTOS (2020) ISSN: 2013-0864
© de l’article, Aran Romero Moreno
© de l’edició, Associació Antropologies
As we have seen with Confucianism, a constitutive part 
of this idea of the sinic world was the differentiation between 
the cultural center wen and the barbaric periphery ye 野. 
Since the very beginning the Chinese territory has been 
shaped by an enormous social and cultural heterogeneity. 
Yet, in an excellent work the historian James Leibold 
(2007) explains how during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) 
the Manchu, considered by the ethnic Han as the barbaric 
periphery, reproduced the same imagery of an uninterrupted 
and unified culture of the Central Kingdom zhongguo 中
国. He argues that even though the Manchu internally 
distinguished themselves from the Han, they externally 
exploited the same essentialized idea of Chinesness to 
evoke refinement and power towards the globalized world. 
This reification of an ethnic continuity would, as a result, 
become indispensable during the republican years to 
construct a national identity. 
The aftermath of the Opium Wars (1839-1860) not only 
triggered a sense of generalized humiliation among the 
peoples of China, but also a need for rethinking the scientific 
and philosophical theories of the past. On this regard, the 
intellectual Liang Qichao was among the firsts to translate 
the Confucian principles of assimilating the barbaric world 
through the Chines way of wen into new social Darwinist 
ideas that conceived races in different stages of evolution, 
Han being the most advanced one. In the near past, two 
big Muslim insurrections had already challenged the 
integrity of the Qing territory and when the last dynasty fell, 
Mongolians, Tibetans and Manchus would not wait to claim 
their own right to self-determination. As Leibold express 
it, “the ability to maintain peace along the frontier was the 
ultimate signifier of a government’s strength, authority, and 
majesty” (Ibid: 79). 
 The first decades of the Republic were forged 
by gunpowder and the words of political debates. By this 
period, the most important epistemic frame of national 
identity was already stablished. The appearance of a big 
other – the colonizing forces– created the conditions of 
possibility for an internal big us, the zhonghua minzu 中
华民族 or sinic race. From this point on, the relation 
towards the big other would became ambivalent, regarded 
as the origin of all evil2  and at the same time a paradigm of 
progress. Initially the Han population blamed the Manchu 
for the defeats and humiliations China suffered since the 
1830s but soon the xenophobic discourse was no longer 
efficient to justify the country’s underdevelopment. Hence, 
the Han intellectuals began to employ another classificatory 
axe situating the urban as synonymous of change and the 
rural as a symbol of temporal stagnation. The ideals of the 
Enlightenment were congruous with the historical avant-
garde of Chinese urbanities that had witness the birth of 
several technologies of the modern world. In this manner, 
the Han reestablished their centrality in the civilizing mission 
by simultaneously unifying the different nations of the Qing 
geo-body against the foreign invader –the big other–, 
reimagining themselves as bearers of the sinic heritage 
of which its maximum expression was the Chinese city. In 
other words, the colonizing forces provoked the historical 
conditions from which the heterogeneous population of 
the Chinese geo-body recognized itself as a unity, or in 
Marx’s terms, as a class for itself. The urban-Han became 
the epistemological center of civilization in a scheme that 
was no longer binary –cultured vs barbaric– but graded in 
terms of economic stratification: “peasants” nongmin 农民 
vs urban-born, and ethnicity: “ethnic minorities” shaominzu
少民族 vs the Han majority.
  2. During the occupation, Japanese were literally known as «devils» guizi 鬼子.
REVISTA D’ANTROPOLOGIA I INVESTIGACIÓ SOCIAL
N29
[CON]TEXTOS (2020)  ISSN: 2013-0864
© de l’article, Aran Romero Moreno
© de l’edició, Associació Antropologies
2.1. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE FEMININE 
BODY
At the advent of the new century, China was portrayed 
both locally and internationally as a sick nation. The 
translator and cultural analyst Sylvia Li-chun Lin (2004) 
shows in her study of commercial ads, magazines and other 
literary production of the Guo Mindang period (1912-1930) 
that “hygiene” weisheng 卫生became an “institutionalized 
nationwide project” where women embodied simultaneously 
modernity, patriarchal values and nationalism in a direct 
relation between hygiene, reproduction and the nation (p. 
223). As in the European case, the exploitation of women 
turned out to be inherent to the development of the nation-
state . First, through the free reproductive work that women 
supplied inside the households. Second, through what Lévi-
Strauss (1987) calls the effectiveness of symbols, that is to 
say, woman’s health, hygiene and status became a symbolic 
placebo from which the nation-state measured its distance 
towards progress:
“Hygienic practice, be it the preservation of health, 
or the maintenance of cleanliness, is the overarching 
issue that highlights China’s backwardness and 
demeaned international status. We recall how Hu 
Binxia exhorted Chinese women to keep a clean 
household in order for China to be strong. […] it 
is nevertheless clear that hygienic practice is the 
yardstick by which the middle-class measures its 
difference as well as its claim to modernity” (Lin, 
2004: 219-220). 
Indeed, the symbolic bound between women and 
hygiene was already present in traditional thought. A clear 
example is the Confucian female scholar Ban Zhao (1899) 
that considered this issue in her book “Lessons for Women” 
Nujie 女诫 (80 CE), where she asserts that a woman’s duty 
consists not only in showing deference and obedience 
toward husband and mother-in-law, but also to embody 
cleanness, purity and chastity through the cultivation of 
“appearances” rong 容.
 As we have seen so far, nationalism was constructed 
under the myth of an ethnic unity, the great descendants of 
the Yellow Emperor. Blood and by extension hygiene and 
health were the essential instrument for the survival of the 
sinic race. In his project of returning China to its greatness, 
Sun Yat-Sen4  glanced an amalgamation of ethnicities 
promoting growth and mixture in a violent moment of 
 3. To understand the relation between gendered labor and the development of European modern nation-states and market economies see (Federici, 2017).
 4. The first president of the Chinese Republic.
Figure 1. 
Graph of national identity
(Source: Author) 
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decreasing population (Leibold, 2007). From a political 
perspective, the weisheng discourse focused mainly on 
the relation between health and reproduction –woman and 
child– as embodiments of the nation; albeit grassroots level 
grievances also involved demands for cities free of garbage, 
free of feces, clean water, etc. Meantime, the Chinese elites 
capitalized this situation trying to distance themselves from 
“identification with peasants and their ‘lacks’” (Erbaugh, 
2008: 640). Sun-Yat Sen himself criticized in a speech of 
1924 the manners of the Chinese population and their “lack 
of personal hygiene” (Ibid). The president of the republic 
was echoing here a popular rhetoric in Europe since the 
18th century. The claim made by medical experts and urban 
planners was that in the past humanity enjoyed better health 
directly associating industrial life and misery with sickness 
and pollution, altogether with the idea that morality and 
education were the only possible cure to the polluting 
effects of poverty (Larrea, 1997).  
After the victory of the CCP at the civil war class 
struggle became the fundamental thrive for democracy. 
Mao Zedong charged against both Confucian conceptions 
of order and the bourgeois elitism associated with the 
West. From now then, ceremonial manners were seen 
as an obstacle to democracy: “Generals shall not beat 
soldiers and their stipend must be equitable, soldiers need 
to maintain gatherings and express freely their opinions, 
trivial courtesies [fansuo de lijie 烦琐的礼节] shall be 
abolished and the economy collectivized. Both the people 
and military institutions need to be democratized” (Mao, 
1966: 501).
 Certainly, the adoption of Marxism-Leninism 
as state’s ideology was an important shift in the Chinese 
civilizing paradigm; if in the past order was a matter of 
tradition and customs, now order would become equivalent 
of self-ordainment, an act of collective appropriation of 
the future. The victory of socialism represented a unique 
opportunity to revert the inequalities between urban 
and rural, men and women, the ethnic majority and the 
ethnical other. Between 1950 and 1958 important laws and 
economic changes were introduced to attack the problems 
of inequality: the Agrarian Reform (1950-1952), the Law of 
Marriage (1950) and the minban educational system were 
some of the most prominent examples. However, even 
though poverty was objectively reduced, the balance of 
power derived from the nationalist scheme was never truly 
challenged. The implementation of the hukou system in 
1958 resulted de facto in the reification of the axes between 
the civilized and the uncivilized (see Figure 1). Inspired 
by Stalin’s prospiska, an internal passport that bounded 
people to their native land, the hukou brought the urban/
rural discrimination into new dimensions creating “on one 
hand, an urban class whose members have basic social 
welfare and full citizenship, and on the other, an underclass 
of peasants possessing neither” (Chan, 2012: 67). 
 The anthropologist Sara L. Friedman (2004) 
serves us with an ethnographic example of how during the 
Maoist period women –especially rural women– became, 
once more, the target of the civilizing apparatus. The author 
explains through the voices of Hui’an women –a cultural 
minority from South China– how during this period 
local cadres of rural areas banned the use of traditional 
hairstyles, dresses and other folk complements that were 
seen as “feudal vestiges”, incompatible with the ideals of 
the socialist revolution. 
3.MAOISM: BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND 
REPRODUCTION
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“Marxist-inspired evolutionary analysis, together 
with the writings and recollections of official 
reformers, defined “the Hui’an woman” as straddling 
the boundary between Han and non-Han, socialist 
and feudal, civilized and backward. […] In other 
words, “the Hui’an woman” forced state reformers 
to acknowledge the powerful obstacles that they 
faced in striving to realize socialist civilization. As 
a potential (Han) socialist citizen, this figure did 
not reaffirm the boundaries of the civilized nation 
as much as she exposed its limits. Her embodied 
practices cloaked what was supposed to be familiar 
and understandable in unfamiliar garb, unsettling 
officials at various levels of the bureaucracy 
and inspiring intrusive and sometimes violent 
interventions in women’s bodies” (Friedman, 2004: 
699-700).
To highlight the points made here; even if the Maoist 
period signified a calling into question of the traditional 
structures of power, the nation-state continued employing 
the same strategies of normalization of the past: intervening 
women’s bodies –the paradigm of proletarian woman–, 
prioritizing urban over rural – e. g. the disasters of the 
Great Leap Forward (1958-1961)– and marginalizing 
ethnic minorities –the passive colonization of the territory. 
Friedman asserts that civilization as a normalizing 
apparatus has a clear continuity between the Maoist period 
and the present times. Hui’an women, she concludes, ended 
up imagining themselves employing the same ideas of 
progress as the state reproducing their own exclusion in 
a structure that calls “symbolic citizenship” in allusion to 
Pierre Bourdieu’s (2000) symbolic violence. 
We would add to Friedman’s conclusions that this 
continuity can be traced all along Chinese history as a 
sociogenetic phenomenon –the process of civilization 
or wenming process–, shaping relations of power in a 
very particular way. Process that only in recent times has 
found a synthesis through explicit political campaigns and 
legislations.
“If you were the headscarf and go out dancing, 
then everyone will laugh at you” [voices one of 
Friedman’s informants]. […]The figure of the young 
woman ‘who wears the headscarf’ was associated 
in village discourse with qualities of (sometimes 
excessive) modesty, close-mindedness, and the 
inability to understand how to be progressive or 
‘open’ (kaifang)” (Friedman, 2004: 706).
With Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the reformist wing 
of the Party took over the leadership of the country. Deng 
Xiaoping pronounced then the emblematic phrase “to allow 
some get rich first” that summarizes states’ abandon of 
class struggle. Knowing the problematic nature of such a 
change, the market system was implemented gradually at 
the province level parallel to an active promotion of a new 
–old– creed, this time explicitly formulated in terms of 
wenming文明. That was the origin of the two civilizations 
campaign in the early 1980s. The plan was a solution to 
conciliate modernization with tradition, globalization with 
nationalism, associating the West with material progress 
and China with “spiritual civilization” jingshen wenming 
精神文明 (Dynon, 2008). The return to Confucianism 
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was, for many reasons, a pragmatic political decision. 
First, as the past has repeatedly demonstrated, Confucian 
thought has been useful to promote harmony in contexts of 
social inequality. Second, Confucianism offers a Chinese 
uniqueness that strengthens national identity. Finally, 
Confucian family-based system was in part a solution to the 
problem of healthcare deriving again the reproductive work 
–previously assumed by the state– into the family core, or 
more particularly onto women (Zavoretti, 2010).
 The idea of spiritual civilization was officially 
presented in the Twelve Central Committee of the 
Communist Party in 1986 (Ho, 2008). During this period, 
several campaigns for the promotion of civic behavior 
already circulated in the cities, most of the time led by public 
organizations such as the Women’s Federation, the Chinese 
Ethical Society and the Ministries of Propaganda and 
Health. In the late nineties, the Party created a subdivision 
of the Central Propaganda Department called Central 
Guidance Comission for Building Spiritual Civilization 
administrating all campaigns and activities related with 
civility (Brady, 2009; Tomba, 2014). In 2012 the concept 
of wenming was included as one of the “core values and 
norms of Socialism” Shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhiguan社会主
义核心价值观, the government’s most ambitious ethical 
campaign since the Reforms of 1978 (Dai, 2015).
 Today, wenming rhetoric can be found not only 
in governmental speeches, but also in the landscape of 
Chinese major urbanities. Cities are literally covered with 
banners, pamphlets, advertisements and clips on how to 
behave properly in the public space. These urban texts 
employ the esthetics of traditional language, frequently with 
rhymes and ambiguous statements that recall Confucian 
quotes. While the uses of wenming may seem vague, a 
closer look to the public space reveals that the concept has 
different layers of concreteness deriving from place-specific 
situations. A clear example is the following announcement 
found in many public toilets of China: “use the toilet in a 
civilized way” wenming cesuo文明厕所. Here the term 
seems to appeal to people’s common sense without further 
defining what wenming is; nonetheless inside the restrooms 
we find allusions to specific practices such as: do not 
throw cigarettes in the toilets, do not spit, save paper, it is 
forbidden to squat on western-style toilets –zheji pandeng 
禁止攀登–, do not throw garbage, etc. The list of these 
practical recommendations is broad, a set of hygienic, 
ecological and security directions that mix with purely moral 
precepts –do not dress in messy cloths, do not shout, do 
not speak foolishly, etc.– comprising a complex ideological 
system that seeks simultaneously for both functionality and 
classification. This is how a banner in the city of Nanjing in 
2017 defined the term wenming.
“Wenming is a sign of progress, also an important 
characteristic of a Modern Nation. The proper 
condition for the construction of a modern nation 
and a socialist culture. It means face modernity, 
face globalization, the future, identity, Science and 
Culture, as well as popular socialism. The essential 
pillar to return China to its greatness.”5 
Paradoxically, although nowadays wenming rhetoric 
and Confucian ethics are employed indistinctly as the 
 5.  Campaign for the promotion of core values and norms of Socialism –shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhiguan. District of Xuanwu, Nanjing city, 2017. Translated by 
the author.
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same thing, addressing the totality of city dwellers through 
general rules of behavior, wenming ideology breaks with 
the ontological limits of familiarity in traditional thought. 
Thus, wenming as a political concept aims to stablish a 
classificatory system based on abstract, independent of 
social position, categories of the good citizen never found 
in China before.         
Parallel to the emergence of wenming as a political 
concept, another term gained presence in official discourse: 
“quality” suzhi 素质, probably the word that has 
aroused most attention among Social Scientists studying 
contemporary China. The first character su素refers to 
something “raw, plain, uncolored”, the pictogram of a thread 
of raw silk 素 hanging from a plant. The second character zhi
素 regards to the “matter, substance” of things, two axes over 
a cowry shell. The word can be found in ancient texts as the 
Guanzi 管子 (475 BCE) or the Zhoushu周书 (636 CE) (Xu 
et al., 2014). 
 Scholars coincide in pointing out that suzhi is an 
index from which people’s quality or value is measured in 
terms of high or low degree –gao 高or di低– (Anagnost, 
2004; Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 2004; Tomba, 2014; Xu et al., 
2014; Yan, 2003). The anthropologist Andrew Kipnis (2006) 
argues that during the commencement of the twentieth 
century, due to the influence of Darwinism suzhi had the 
connotations of inborn characteristics, a meaning that slowly 
changed after the introduction of market economy. Rachel 
Murphy (2004) and Xu Liguo (2014) follow a similar view 
arguing that suzhi refers to both innate and nurtured traits, 
as in “physical suzhi a mix of various factors, including 
heredity, intensity of training, diet and mental state, among 
other things” (p. 133). Contrarily, Ann Anagnost (2004) 
states that suzhi “is not something that naturally inheres in 
the body but is rather something that must be built into the 
body –a supplement that must be added to its ‘bare life’” 
(p. 193). As pointed out above, the literature dedicated to 
the concept of suzhi is abundant, a concept that has called 
the attention of many disciplines. Based on the arguments 
and historical facts exposed in this article our claim is that 
suzhi is nothing more than the direct consequence of the 
process of civilization, and ultimately of wenming as the 
contemporary synthesis of this process.
 Suzhi was brought into official discourse through 
two specific policies: 1) Quality education suzhi jiaoyu 素
质教育 and 2) the one-child policy dusheng zinu zhengce 
独生子女政策. The first involved the standardization of 
the educational system in 1985, transforming the Maoist 
minban 民办 schools which purpose was to make-
literate the highest number of children possible all around 
the country, into a model of curriculum homologation 
with mandatory periods “emphasizing creativity, civic 
responsibility and overall personal development” (Murphy, 
2004: 6). The one-child policy of 1979 on the other hand, 
was the most important regulation on family planning 
since the Maoist period. The law was aimed at stabilizing 
the population’s growth, making possible the material 
conditions for Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations6 
. Both policies inscribed into the broader narrative of 
changing China’s model of development from quantity to 
quality: from rural to urban, from a low-end to a middle 
  6. Agriculture, industry, national defense, Science and Technology. 
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class nation. A transition that Anagnost (2004) insightfully 
describes as an extraction of value from the force of labor 
of rural migrants –quantitative material capital– into the 
now educated only-child –qualitative cultural capital– two 
constitutive parts of the same totality. If wenming is the 
system of daily life practices –rituals– that separate the 
civilized from the uncivilized bodies, as we have seen so far 
based on epistemic categories of ethnicity and class, we can 
say that suzhi is its direct consequence. So that, uncivilized 
practices produce low quality persons in a sort of karmic 
reaction that justifies the exploitation of certain bodies in 
benefit of others within a nationalistic logic of transforming 
the country into a modern, fairly-rich society.
“The laboring migrant body is the hidden source 
of wealth production in China’s economic “takeoff,” 
even as its lack of value is blamed for holding 
back China’s development. The discourse of suzhi 
therefore yields a surplus value not just in the 
economic realm but also in the realm of political 
representation. It works ideologically as a regime 
of representation through which subjects recognize 
their positions within the larger social order and 
thereby sets up the conditions for socioeconomic 
striving” (Anagnost, 2004: 193).
In this article, we have seen the multiple dimensions 
of a concept that transcends its own terms. Etymologically 
wenming barely has more than two centuries of existence. 
Epistemologically though, wenming as a moral, hygienic 
and pragmatic system of values is intimately intertwined 
with Confucian doctrine and the historical milestones 
presented here –what we have called the wenming process. 
On this manner, this process of civilization characterizes 
by being multi-focal and rooted on the doxic reality of 
Chinese society. We have prompted some of the most 
important historical events that constitute this reality. 1) 
Confucianism as the hypostasis of traits that have persisted 
within the Chinese social structure, that is to say, a strong 
differentiation between the insider and the outsider –circles 
of familiarity–, an atavistic preference for the domain 
of culture –wen–, and a highly codified mode of social 
interaction in form of rites. 2) The traumatic confrontation 
with the imperial powers that made possible the appearance 
of an ethnic unity –based on a myth of cultural continuity, 
the sinic race. 3) An historical objectification of the feminine 
body as a force of free labor and as a symbol of hygienic 
identity –being Confucian or National identity. 
 When we apply to the analysis of these three 
events the variables of class and race, we learn that civilized 
is an epistemological category that ended up taking the 
urban-Han subject at its core in a layered scheme of power 
relations (see Figure 1), being the rural non-Han subject 
its total opposite. Gender, on the other side, is not per se 
an index that informs the distance between civilized and 
uncivilized, but rather an essential tool to intervene in 
the economic and symbolic fabric of society itself, in its 
modern form the nation-state. Moreover, we have seen that 
weisheng “hygiene” is another key concept that links both 
the wenming process and the modern wenming political 
discourse. Hygienic femininity offers a third-eye point of 
view –the national view– from which a sense of progress is 
quantified at the same time that, in a micro level, weisheng 
serves to identify rural poverty as polluting and potentially 
dangerous. 
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 On the other hand, we have seen that so often 
the Maoist period has been associated with revolution and 
dramatic change, however in terms of the wenming process, 
said once again, as an epistemic frame of power relations, 
we argue that the real changes were few. Women’s bodies 
continued to be at the center of ideological intervention 
this time through the ideal of proletarian woman. Ethnic 
diversity was marginalized through a slow but strong 
process of Han colonization, and urban-centrism was 
extremely accentuated with the introduction of the hukou 
system –an internal passport that legally confines people 
to their motherlands. Most important, we have argued that 
this scheme of power relation persisted not only during the 
Maoist period but still until today. 
 Thus, the new dimension of the process of 
civilization is the policy of civilization, explicitly formulated 
after the introduction of market economy in 1978 through 
the concept of wenming. Since then, the CCP has promoted 
the wenming political project with two main purposes: 1) to 
cushion the transition from a model of quantity to a model 
of quality, from rural to urban, from classless to middle 
class society. In this sense, civility serves to downplay 
inequalities within Xi Jinping’s national project of reviving 
“the magnificence of the ancient and glorious civilization” 
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